Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (1959–1965) — Indonesia-Soviet Union Cooperation
By: Jason Ferdinand Wijaya
Indonesia’s foreign policies from 1959 to 1965 was a period under the influence of President Sukarno’s leadership, as well as the growth in the influence of the leftist element such as The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in Indonesian socio-political life. But before the 1959s Indonesia’s political system used to be a Liberal Democracy system which meant Sukarno’s freedom of action had been limited by Parliament Institutions. Sukarno had long been impatient with most political parties in parliament which were unable to bring political stability to provide national leadership. Reflected in six cabinet changes between 1950 and 1957, that eroded the foundation of the parliamentary system. Soon after, Sukarno introduced the concept of Guided Democracy. Although the concept was new in name, its various themes had been part of the president’s thinking since before the war. But the change happened in July 1959; the liberal phase of Indonesian history was brought to an end with Sukarno’s proclamation of president declaration, or often to be known as Dekrit President 1959. In an unstable and ultimately catastrophic coalition with the army and the PKI, he sought to rescue the fragile unity of the archipelago (Worden,1993). This became the mark of the beginning of the guided democracy era (1959–1965) with President Sukarno as supreme leader of Indonesia.
One of Indonesia’s foreign policies of president Sukarno’s leadership during the guided democracy era is Indonesia-Soviet friendly relations which make the Soviets eager to help Indonesia with economic and military aid during a confrontation with Malaysia and the liberation of West New Guinea from Dutch occupation. Indonesia also was one of the first countries to receive large quantities of Soviet aid. From 1945 (before the guided democracy era) to 1965, the Soviet Union channeled more resources to Indonesia than any other developing country except Egypt. Even though these countries had no common border, no colonial ties, and not even a tradition of direct trade. The close Soviet-Indonesian relationship that emerged is even more remarkable if one takes into consideration that North Vietnam, with its firm roots in the communist camp, was receiving less attention from Moscow at this time. Furthermore, the most visible and spectacular object of Soviet engagement in Indonesia was the huge sports complex in Jakarta, which was something that did not fit into the usual notion of “socialist” development policy (Boden, 2008).
To analyze the role of Sukarno as the leading figure in Indonesia’s foreign policy from 1955 to 1965, which related to Indonesia-Soviet cooperation, the writer used the Rational Actor Model Approach with the paradigm of actor-centered (focus on weighing options). The rational actor model is based on cost and benefit and has five assumptions which are: first, human beings tend to maximize utility; second, decision-making process based on full information; third, humans as species; fourth, transitive; and fifth, consistence. There are eight steps in the rational actor model according to Grey Crashman, 1993 there are: identify a problem, identify and rank goals, gather information, identify alternatives for reaching goals, analyze alternatives by considering the consequences and effectiveness (coast and benefits) of each alternative and probabilities associated with success, select the alternative that maximizes chances of selecting best alternatives as determined in step five, implementing the decision, and the last monitor and evaluate.
Indonesia’s foreign policy during President Sukarno’s (1955–1965) era has been influenced heavily by the country’s experiences in securing its independence from a foreign power. To maintain that independence in a world superpower competition. Foreign policy under Sukarno was radical, characterized by Sukarno’s self-styled role as a revolutionary leader of developing countries. Indonesia committed itself to pursue a ‘free and active’ foreign policy which concentrated on opposition to colonialism and to securing an international position apart from the prevailing Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union which become a big problem on the international stage in the post-war era.
The hosting of the Bandung conference of non-aligned countries in 1955 and support for the Non-Aligned Movement after its inauguration in 1961 were a major reflection of these priorities. Sukarno was caught between the contending forces of the army and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Sukarno saw foreign policy as a way of diverting attention from pressing domestic issues in the interest of promoting national unity. From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, Indonesia’s foreign policy in the era of the Sukarno government’s ‘guided democracy’ became much more assertive and become radical with anti-colonial rhetoric increasing and an attempt made to oppose the development of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and attempt to liberated by force of West New Guinea from Dutch occupation. Perhaps suggesting that the political balance was shifting toward the left. Sukarno proclaimed to be a leader of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) in opposition to the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS), and Indonesia was linked to other radical Asian states in a Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Pyongyang-Beijing Axis, which had put Indonesia at odd with the whole Western world, culminating in Indonesia’s exit from the United Nations (Yani, 2009).
Sukarno’s political shifting to the left and Indonesia's links with other leftist countries such as Cambodia, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Communist China led Indonesia's relations to become closer with communist superpower country the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Indonesia supported and influence the political decision of president Sukarno which tend to be left and his agenda is in opposition to colonialism which is similar to the Soviet Union's agenda also has the anti-Western colonialism and capitalist agenda. This becomes the primary factor in closer relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.
The strategy of political background had been used by president Sukarno to maximize Soviet economic and military aid to Indonesia in order to wage a ‘war’ against ‘Western colonialism’. Relations between the two countries were shaped in part by Sukarno’s worldview (known as Marhaenism), which combined Islamic elements with Nationalism and Marxist- Socialism. The Soviet Union under the leadership of Khrushchev are attempts to classify the developing countries according to their political systems were expanded during the world congress of 81 Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow in 1960 which Indonesia was defined as one of the “states of national democracy. This meant that even though Indonesia did not qualify as a socialist “people’s democracy”, but its fight against “new forms of colonialism and the encroachments of imperialist capital” was worthy of praise which makes the Soviet Union are eager to give the aid to Indonesia with a big amount of aid in the economic and military assistance.
With the analysis of Rational Actor Model, President Sukarno got much more benefit with extraordinary large share from Soviet aid with The President Sukarno as the central figure of Indonesia and become the only one as decision-maker actor with the consideration of his supporter. According to top secret data compiled by Gosplan, the Soviet Union supplied Indonesia with 789 million Rubles’ worth of assistance during those years, more than one-fifth (21 percent) of the total amount provided by Moscow to all non-socialist developing countries. The assistance provided to Indonesia was mostly in the form of loans, which outweighed grants by roughly 14 to 1. This proportions was officially justified on the grounds that socialist countries, with economies that produced no surplus, could not afford to allocate large quantities of resources to developing countries, instead Soviet officials were willing to lend money to Indonesia in the hope of spurring fast economic growth, which would ensure repayment of the loans within twelve years. The Indonesians were also given considerable leeway to decide how to use Soviet aid. Indonesia with the Soviet loans spend on numerous project which had been planned, listed a specific projects in the fields of heavy industry (steel production sites), agroindustry (especially fertilizer factories), energy (thermal power stations), and infrastructure (street building), and educational institutions for shipbuilding and oceanography. But despite the enormous sums spent, very few projects were completed. The only notable exception was the most ambitious undertaking, the huge stadium in Jakarta (Senayan Sport Complex) for a capacity of 100,000 spectators, which took only two years to build. The complex cost $12.5 million and served as a prestige project to host the fourth Asian Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in 1964.
President Sukarno also used the funding from Soviet Union to build up the country’s armed forces in order to press Indonesian claims to West New Guinea and liberated them from the Dutch Occupation; and in 1962 Indonesia finally successfully incorporated West New Guinea into its territory. After that Indonesia also embarked on a new military undertaking the confrontation against Malaysia in 1963 as anti-colonialism agenda of President Sukarno which oppose international recognition of the former British colony and tried to prevent Malaysia from incorporating parts of North Borneo (Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei) into its territory.
But not all Soviet aid could give benefit to Indonesia because there are the costs and consequences that President Sukarno must face. The cost is coming from domestic politics, which is from the opposition faction, like the main Islamic Party (Masyumi and Nadhatul Ulama) and some elements in the armed forces were fearful of Soviet with their communist influence. The opposition faction hindered but did not forestall the development of Soviet-Indonesian political and economic ties. As for the consequences itself, Indonesia has become more isolated since Indonesia’s exit from United Nations and more Western countries despise Sukarno and have labeled him as a ‘commie’ and ‘anti-Western’. There is the political instability in the domestic politics of Indonesia in 1965 which led to Sukarno being overthrown from Indonesian leadership.
Based on the explanation and analysis above, President Sukarno is the rational actor because he is trying to maximize cooperation between Indonesia and Soviets while considering the cost and benefit of his decision. The growing threats he faces from the Western countries in struggle against colonialism and imperialism in context of Cold War and the political instability, with Sukarno caught between the contending forces of the army and the communist (PKI). Sukarno saw foreign policy as a way of diverting attention from pressing domestic issues in the interest of promoting national unity. He also knows Indonesia couldn’t survive alone and needed an ally with a similar agenda. So, his option is to cooperate with other countries like Soviet Union to create a strong unity of the nation in order to maintain sovereignty and independence of Indonesia.
References
Wibisono, H. K. (n.d.). Indonesia’s Foreign Politics 1955–1965: Between Decolonisation and Beacon Politics.
L.Worden, W. H. (1993). Indonesia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
Boden, R. (2008). Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia. Journal of Cold War Studies, 110–128.
Yani, Y. M. (2009). CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY. Sosiohumaniora, Vol. 11, №1, 1–16.
Bob Hering, Soekarno: Founding Father of Indonesia, 1901–1945 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002)
“Amounts of Economic Aid Provided to Foreign Countries from the Beginning of the Projects to 1 January 1965” (Top Secret), 1965/1966, in RGAE, F. 4372, Op. 81, D. 1775, Ll. 72–73.
“Number of Projects and Facilities Built and Being Built with Technical Support from the Soviet Union in Developing Countries (By Country),” Informational Sheet, 1965, in RGAE, F. 4372,Op. 81, D. 1775, L. 86.
The GANEFO were propagated by Sukarno as an alternative to the Olympic Games. See Ewa T. Pauker, GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta, Report No. P-2935 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 1964).
On the territorial conflict, see C. L. M. Penders, The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia 1945–1962 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002)
